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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Eric Thomas Ferrier appeals from the district court's denial of his Rule 35 motion 
for correction of sentence. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
On May 8, 1998, a grand jury indicted Ferrier for the murders of Walter Jesse 
Ellison and Jafra Janelle Sumaya, which had occurred on March 30, 1996. (#29576 
Supp. R., 1 pp.13-14.) The indictment charged two counts of first degree murder, each 
with weapon enhancements. (Id.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, the state amended 
the indictment to two counts of second degree murder and Ferrier pied guilty. (#29576 
Supp. R., pp.34-38.) The district court entered judgment against Ferrier and imposed 
two concurrent fixed life sentences. (R., pp.22-23.) Ferrier had been represented by 
the Twin Falls Public Defender's Office. (Id.) 
More than a decade later, Ferrier filed a motion for correction or reduction of 
sentence under Idaho Criminal Rule 35. (R., pp.11-17.) In his Rule 35 motion, he 
alleged that his sentences were illegal, expressing the theory that Idaho Code § 18-
4004, read in conjunction with Idaho Code §§ 19-2515(7)(c) 2 and 19-2513, does not 
allow for the imposition of fixed life sentences. (Id.) Ferrier requested counsel (R., 
1 On August 31, 2011, the Idaho Supreme Court issued an order augmenting the 
appellate record in this case with the appellate record from Ferrier's prior appeal in 
docket no. 29576. Citations to that record include the docket no., while citations to the 
record on appeal in this case do not. 
2 In both his Rule 35 motion to correct sentence and on appeal, Ferrier actually cites to 
"I.C. § 19-2515(c)." That code section does not exist. Based on the context of Ferrier's 
argument, the state assumes he intended to cite to I.C. § 19-2515(7)(c), and addresses 
his argument accordingly. 
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pp.18-20), and the district court appointed the Twin Falls Public Defender's Office (R., 
p.24). Ferrier subsequently moved the district court to appoint substitute counsel, 
arguing that the public defender's office was ineffective, as its prior representation had 
resulted in his current sentences, and this created a conflict of interest. (R., pp.27-31.) 
The district court did not rule on the motion to appoint substitute counsel. 
After a hearing on the Rule 35 motion, the district court denied the motion on the 
ground that the sentences imposed were not illegal on the face of the record. (R., 
pp.33-37.) Ferrier filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.39-41.) 
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ISSUES 
Ferrier states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Does the complete failure of the District Court to consider and rule 
upon the motion for appointment of conflict counsel require reversal of the 
order denying Mr. Ferrier's Criminal Rule 35 motion? 
2. Was the Rule 35 motion erroneously denied because a fixed life 
sentence may not legally be imposed for second degree murder? 
(Appellant's brief, p.2.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Ferrier failed to establish error in the district court's denial of his frivolous 
Rule 35 motion? 
2. Because Ferrier's Rule 35 motion was frivolous, is any error in the district court's 
failure to address and rule on Ferrier's motion for substitute counsel harmless? 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Ferrier Has Failed To Establish Error In The District Court's Denial Of His Frivolous 
Rule 35 Motion 
A. Introduction 
Ferrier asserts that Idaho Code § 18-4004, when read in conjunction with Idaho 
Code §§ 19-2513 and 19-2515(7)(c), does not permit the imposition of a fixed life 
sentence for second degree murder, and so the district court erred in denying his Rule 
35 motion to correct his sentence. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-6.) Ferrier's argument lacks 
merit. Idaho Code § 18-4004 expressly permits the imposition of a fixed life sentence 
for second degree murder. On the face of the record, there is nothing illegal about 
Ferrier's sentence. His Rule 35 motion is therefore frivolous and he has failed to show 
error in the district court's denial of that motion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a sentence is illegal is a question of law that is freely reviewed by the 
court on appeal. State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 84, 218 P.3d 1143, 1145 (2009). 
Likewise, statutory interpretation is a question of law over which appellate courts 
exercise free review. State v. Peregrina, 151 Idaho 538, 539, 261 P.3d 815, 816 
(2011); State v. Mosqueda, 150 Idaho 830, 833, 252 P.3d 563, 566 (Ct. App. 2010). 
C. Ferrier's Rule 35 Motion Is Frivolous 
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 is a narrow rule that allows a trial court to correct at any 
time a sentence that is illegal from the face of the record. I.C.R. 35(a); Clements, 148 
Idaho at 84, 218 P.3d at 1145. Rule 35 is not a vehicle designed to re-examine the 
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underlying the case to determine whether a 
applies to a narrow category of cases in which the sentence imposes a penalty that is 
simply not authorized by law. Clements, 148 Idaho at 84, 218 P.3d at 1145. An illegal 
sentence under Rule 35 is one in excess of a statutory provision or otherwise contrary 
to applicable law. State v. Alsanea, 138 Idaho 733, 745, 69 P.3d 153, 165 (Ct App. 
2003). Applying these correct legal standards, Ferrier has failed to show that his 
sentence is illegal. 
On April 16, 1999, Chief Justice Burdick, as the district judge, entered judgment 
against Ferrier on two counts of second degree murder and sentenced him to a "fixed 
term of life without the eligibility of parole" on each count, with the sentences running 
concurrently. (R., pp.22-23.) Ferrier's sentence is not "in excess of a statutory 
provision." The punishment for second degree murder is set forth in Idaho Code § 18-
4004. By its express terms, that statute authorizes a fixed life sentence for second 
degree murder. It reads, in pertinent part, "[e]very person guilty of murder of the second 
degree is punishable by imprisonment not less than ten (10) years and the 
imprisonment may extend to life." LC.§ 18-4004. Nor is Ferrier's sentence "otherwise 
contrary to applicable law." Idaho appellate courts have routinely upheld fixed life 
sentences imposed on convictions for second degree murder. See, M.:., State v. 
Delling, Docket Nos. 36920/36921, 2011 Opinion No. 128 (Dec. 1, 2011 ); State v. 
Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 876-77, 253 P.3d 310, 313-14 (2011); State v. Cooe, 142 
Idaho 492,502, 129 P.3d 1241, 1251 (2006); State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276, 1 
P.3d 299, 304 (Ct. App. 2000). Ferrier's sentence is not "illegal from the face of the 
record." The district court, therefore, properly denied Ferrier's Rule 35 motion. 
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On Ferrier rehearses his arguments from below, contending that Idaho 
Code§ 18-4004, when read in conjunction with§§ 19-2513 and 19-2515(7)(c), does not 
allow a fixed life sentence for second degree murder. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-6.) The 
district court rejected this meritless argument (R., pp.35-36), and this Court should, too. 
As already noted above, Idaho Code § 18-4004 expressly permits the imposition of a 
fixed [ife sentence for second degree murder. Idaho Code§ 19-2513 reads, in pertinent 
part: 
The court shall specify a minimum period of confinement and may specify 
a subsequent indeterminate period of custody. The court shall set forth in 
its judgment and sentence the minimum period of confinement and the 
subsequent indeterminate period, if any, provided, that the aggregate 
sentence shall not exceed the maximum provided by law. 
I.C. § 19-2513 (emphasis added). By the express terms of this statute, the district court 
is required to specify a minimum term of confinement; it is not required to pronounce 
any subsequent indeterminate period of custody. The district court's sentence specifies 
the minimum period of Ferrier's confinement: Life, without the possibility of parole. 
(See R., pp.22-23.) There is, therefore, no subsequent indeterminate period of custody 
to pronounce. Finally, Idaho Code § 19-2515(7)(c) applies to convictions for first degree 
murder and is not applicable in the context of second degree murder. Even if it were 
applicable, it would only require that the district court impose a life sentence with at 
least ten years fixed, and would still permit the district court to make the entire life 
sentence determinate. See I.C. § 19-2515(7)(c). 
On the face of the record, Ferrier's sentence does not exceed any statutory 
provisions, nor is it otherwise contrary to applicable law. Ferrier has failed to show any 
error in the district court's rejection of his entirely meritless Rule 35 motion for correction 
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of sentence. The district court properly 
denying relief should be affirmed. 
11. 
Ferrier's Rule 35 motion and its order 
Because Ferrier's Rule 35 Motion Was Frivolous, The District Court's Error In Failing To 
Address And Rule On Ferrier's Motion To Appoint Substitute Counsel To Pursue His 
Rule 35 Motion Was Harmless 
A. Introduction 
Ferrier contends, alternatively, that the district court committed reversible error by 
not ruling on his motion for substitute appointed counsel and/or by not inquiring into the 
conflict of interest alleged by Ferrier in that motion, before denying Rule 35 relief. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.2-4.) Because Ferrier's Rule 35 motion was frivolous, he had no 
right to appointed counsel to pursue it. Accordingly, any error committed by the district 
court in not ruling on Ferrier's motion for substitute counsel was harmless. 
B. Ferrier Had No Right To Counsel To Pursue His Frivolous Rule 35 Motion And, 
As Such, Any Error Committed By The District Court In Failing To Rule On The 
Motion For Substitute Counsel Is Harmless 
Ferrier argues that the district court's failure to rule on his motion to appoint 
substitute counsel is reversible error. (Appellant's brief, pp.2-4.) Even assuming error, 
however, such error is necessarily harmless. Failure to rule on a motion for 
appointment of counsel on a Rule 35 motion before determining the merits of the 
underlying Rule 35 motion is harmless error where the Rule 35 motion is frivolous as a 
matter of law. See State v. Wade, 125 Idaho 522, 525, 873 P.2d 167, 170 (Ct. App. 
1994). As argued above, Ferrier's Rule 35 motion is frivolous as a matter of law (see 
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Argument I.C, supra); therefore, any error in failing to address or rule on Ferrier's 
motion to appoint substitute counsel is also harmless. 
A criminal defendant has the statutory right to counsel at all stages of the criminal 
process, including pursuit of a Rule 35 motion.3 Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 923 
n.3, 828 P.2d 1323, 1328 n.3 (Ct. App. 1992). This right, however, is not boundless; a 
district court may deny appointment of counsel if the Rule 35 motion is frivolous or one 
that a reasonable person with adequate means would not be willing to bring at his or her 
own expense. I.C. § 19-852(b)(3). A determination of whether a Rule 35 motion is 
frivolous for purposes of applying I.C. § 19-852(b)(3) is based on the contents of the 
motion itself and any accompanying documentation that may support the motion. 
Wade, 125 Idaho at 525, 873 P.2d at 170. Ferrier's Rule 35 motion was frivolous 
because, on its face, there is absolutely nothing illegal about the sentence Ferrier 
received. (See Argument I.C, supra.) The mere exercise of a district court's discretion 
in appointing counsel on a Rule 35 motion does not translate into a right to appointed 
3 On appeal, Ferrier also asserts that criminal defendants have a constitutional right to 
counsel under the Sixth Amendment to pursue a Rule 35 motion. (Appellant's brief, 
pp.2-3.) That is an incorrect statement of the law. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a 
criminal defendant the right to counsel during all "critical stages" of the adversarial 
proceedings against him. Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 562, 149 P.3d 833, 837 
(2006) (citing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967); State v. Ruth, 102 
Idaho 638, 637 P.2d 415 (1981)). "The determination whether [a] hearing is a 'critical 
stage' requiring the provision of counsel depends ... upon an analysis 'whether potential 
substantial prejudice to defendant's rights inheres in the *** confrontation and the ability 
to help avoid that prejudice."' Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970) (asterisks 
original) (quoting Wade, 388 U.S. at 227). A Rule 35 motion, however, can "only benefit 
the defendant by reducing his sentence which had already become final," and does not 
entail a "do-over of an original sentencing proceeding." United States v. Taylor, 414 
F.3d 528, 537 (4th Cir. 2005). Rule 35 challenges, therefore, do not create a critical 
stage of the proceedings and there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel on a Rule 
35 motion. Taylor, 414 F.3d at 537; United States v. Jackson, 923 F.2d 1494, 1496-97 
(11th Cir.1991 ); United States v. Paloma, 80 F.3d 138, 142 (5th Cir. 1996). 
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counsel. In fact, because Ferrier's Rule 
appointed counsel at all, much less a right to 
was frivolous, he had no right to 
appointed counsel of his choosing. 
"Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights 
shall be disregarded." I.C.R. 52. Because Ferrier has no right to appointed counsel to 
pursue a frivolous Rule 35 motion, any error committed by the district court in not ruling 
on the motion to appoint substitute counsel could not have affected Ferrier's substantial 
rights to counsel and is necessarily harmless. 
C. Ferrier Has Failed To Show That The District Court Has A Duty To Inquire Into 
Alleged Conflicts Of Interest In Cases That. At Best. Merely Implicate The 
Statutory Right To Counsel 
Alternatively, Ferrier argues that the district court committed reversible error by 
failing to inquire into his alleged conflict of interest with his attorney. (Appellant's brief, 
pp.3-4.) The Sixth Amendment has been interpreted to encompass the right to be 
represented by conflict-free counsel. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981). 
"Whenever a trial court knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict may 
exist, the trial court has a duty of inquiry" to ensure that criminal defendants are not 
deprived of the effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. State v. 
Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 60, 90 P.3d 278, 285 (2003); see also Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 
U.S. 335, 347 (1980). But this duty to inquire has only been applied in cases that 
implicated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, not the statutory right to 
counsel. See,~. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 347; Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 488 
(1978); State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 703, 215 P.3d 414, 422 (2009); Lovelace, 
140 Idaho at 60, 90 P.3d at 285. Having failed to provide either argument or authority 
that the duty to inquire should be extended to cases which, at best, only implicate the 
9 
statutory right to counsel, Ferrier has waived this issue and it should not be considered 
on appeal. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996). 
Even were this Court to determine that the duty to inquire should be extended to 
cases which only implicate the statutory right to counsel, Ferrier has still failed to show 
error in the district court's lack of inquiry. The requirements of an adequate inquiry are 
fact specific and should be determined on a case-by-case basis. Atley v. Ault, 191 F .3d 
865, 872 (8th Cir. 1999). In order for there to be a conflict of interest, there must be 
separate interests that actually conflict. See, ~. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350; Holloway, 
435 U.S. at 481-82. The so-called "conflict of interest" that Ferrier asserted was that the 
public defender's office had, more than ten years previously, provided what he 
characterized as ineffective assistance of counsel, and that resulted in what he claimed 
was an illegal sentence. (R., pp.27-28.) Even assuming, arguendo, that all of Ferrier's 
specious claims were true, he still failed to allege a conflict of interest Rather, he has 
merely asserted a lack of confidence in his appointed counsel's competence, and that is 
not a sufficient basis for substitute counsel. See State v. Gamble, 146 Idaho 331, 336, 
193 P.3d 878, 883 (Ct. App. 2008) ("Notably, the right to counsel does not necessarily 
mean a right to the attorney of one's choice, and mere lack of confidence in otherwise 
competent counsel is not necessarily grounds for substitute counsel in the absence of 
extraordinary circumstances.") (citations omitted); State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586, 594, 
181 P.3d 512, 520 (Ct. App. 2007) (same) (citations omitted). 
Furthermore, even if Ferrier had asserted a cognizable conflict of interest, it 
would still be improper to impute such a conflict to the entire public defender's office. 
See State v. Cook, 144 Idaho 784, 794, 171 P.3d 1282, 1292 (Ct. App. 2007) 
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("automatically disqualifying a public defender where another attorney the office has a 
conflict of interest would significantly hamper the ability to provide legal representation 
of indigent clients"). A per se rule imputing conflicts of interest to affiliated public 
defenders is inappropriate "where there is no indication the conflict would hamper an 
attorney's ability to effectively represent a client." ~ Therefore, even if Messrs. Olson 
and Riggins (the public defenders that represented Ferrier at his original sentencing 
hearing, see R., p.22) had a conflict of interest, that conflict could not be imputed to Mr. 
Anderson (Ferrier's public defender on his Rule 35 motion more than a decade later, 
see R., p.33) absent some indication that the conflict would hamper Mr. Anderson's 
ability to effectively represent Ferrier. Because there was no imputable conflict about 
which to inquire, the district court's failure to inquire is necessarily harmless. 
Ferrier has failed to show that a district court has a duty to inquire into alleged 
conflicts of interest in cases that only implicate the statutory right to counsel. Even if the 
duty to inquire is extended to those cases, because Ferrier failed to allege an actual 
conflict of interest, the district court's failure to inquire is harmless. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's denial of 
Ferrier's frivolous Rule 35 motion. 
DATED this 24th day of February, 2012. 
ENCER 
Deputy Attorney General 
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